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Deontic logic is standardly conceived as
the logic of true statements about the exis-
tence of obligations and permissions. In
his last writings on the subject, G. H.
von Wright criticized this view of deontic
logic, stressing the rationality of norm im-
position as the proper foundation of deon-
tic logic. The present paper is an attempt
to advance such an account of deontic
logic using the formal apparatus of update
semantics and dynamic logic. That is, we
first define norm systems and a semantics
of norm performatives as transformations
of the norm system. Then a static modal
logic for norm propositions is defined on
that basis. In the course of this exposition
we stress the performative nature of (i)
free choice permission, (ii) the sealing legal
principle and (iii) the social nature of per-
mission. That is, (i) granting a disjunctive
permission means granting permission for
both disjuncts; (ii) non-prohibition does
not entail permission, but the authority
can declare that whatever he does not for-
bid is thereby permitted; and (iii) granting
permission to one person means that all
others are committed to not prevent the
invocation of that permission.
Keywords: deontic logic, dynamic seman-
tics, update semantics, imperatives, perfor-
matives.
It is a fundamental feature of norms
that they are imposed and adopted (and
promulgated, reaffirmed, and so on).1
To say this is not to claim that norms
are arbitrary: as human beings, we are
prone to impose and adopt only cer-
tain norms and not others. Rather, it
indicates that norms are not existing in
and of themselves. We may feel com-
pelled to condemn killing human be-
ings, but until we actually do so there
is no norm against it, only our revul-
sion (and inclination to condemn).
Because norms are not natural enti-
ties, the ‘logic of norms’ cannot be
grounded in the logical structure of re-
ality. To explain why p∨q and ¬p∧¬q
cannot both be true, perhaps we appeal
to a correspondence theory of truth.
To explain why an object necessarily is
not both green all over and red all over,
we may appeal to its intrinsic prop-
erties and to the metaphysics of (sec-
ondary) qualities. Yet, to explain why
1This relation between the norm and its in-
troduction is constitutive and not necessarily
temporal: a person may adopt a norm in ac-
cepting blame, but the blame itself, as well as
its acceptance, can only be understood as such
by presupposing that the norm is (thereby)
adopted.
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two norms are conflicting, we cannot do so by means of an appeal to the impossi-
bility of them co-existing. Despite our inclinations to accept only certain norms
and not others, we may still decide to accept norms that turn out to be conflicting
in rare or unforseen cases. Legal experts and judges commonly have to deal with
the co-existence of conflicting norms. The tension between privacy and security is
a familiar source of examples. Security issues may instigate us to endorse a more
stringent security policy (e.g., one involving CCTV cameras), overlooking the
potential conflicts of such a norm with the privacy norms to which we have com-
mitted ourselves already in legally binding international agreements. No doubt
the ten commandments in the New Testament did not reckon with the possibility
of IVF, cloning, HIV, ultrasound, peer-to-peer file sharing, and more—leading to
a potential conflict, either among them, or with certain norms concerning those
new phenomena. So, potential and actual quandaries in our systems of norms do
not make it impossible that such norm systems be put forward and become real.
Consequently, we cannot explain the ‘conflicting’ of two norms in terms of the
impossibility of an actual norm system encompassing both norms. That is, the
proposition stating that the one norm is binding and the proposition stating that
the other norm is binding may both be true, and yet those norms need not be
consistent.
What then, if anything, does it mean that norms are ‘consistent’? Note that this
question is not answered by the statement that two norms are consistent just
in case the proposition that one complies with both is contingent. That state-
ment, if true, would still only concern the question which norms are consistent.
Moreover, it does not clarify what, if any, constraint permissive norms impose on
consistency.
In some of his last works on deontic logic, von Wright proposed that the logic
of norms is to be understood in terms of the practice of norm imposition. Al-
though conflicts may occur in actual norm systems, an authority who imposes
these norms on you is not being rational. Such an authority puts you in a poten-
tial quandary, making it impossible for you to comply with the norms it has put
forward. Similarly, we may add, a person who accepts or endorses such norms
(or the authority of the norm-giver) is not being rational either. In this way, von
Wright proposes to explain the logic of norms by an appeal to the rationality of
the practice of introducing (imposing and endorsing) norms.
p and ¬p are mutually contradictory. But why should O p and O¬p be
deemed so? Answer: A norm-giver who demands that one and the same
state of affairs both be and not be the case cannot have his demand sat-
isfied. He is “crying for the moon.” His issuing the norms is irrational.
(von Wright 1996, 40)
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The concept of consistency to be invoked in explaining norm consistency is there-
fore not that the norms can jointly exist, but that they can be subsequently im-
posed without thereby manifesting irrationality.2
Importantly, this account of norm consistency does not only offer an alternative
grounding of the logic of norms: it also leads us to ask which logical validities ob-
tain for normative language. Which acts of norm imposition can be subsequently
performed without manifesting irrationality? The simple answer would be that
these are all series of acts leading to a body of norms such that the proposition
that those norms are jointly fulfilled is consistent. Von Wright rejects this answer,
on the basis of an account of permission. Standard deontic logic defines permis-
sion as the absence of prohibition. That would mean that permission imposes no
constraints on the possibility to comply with a body of norms. Intuitively, that
seems clearly to get the facts wrong. But why? According to von Wright, in order
to explain this we need to consider the act of giving permission.3
If permission is not just absence of prohibition what is it then as some-
thing “positive”? A person, who has a permission may do, usually also
not do, the permitted thing. But what does the person do who gives a
permission?
Giving permission is a kind of “binding one’s hands.” It is somewhat
like giving a promise or like saying “you are free to do this, I am not go-
ing to interfere.” One could also say that the permission-giver imposes a
prohibition on himself not to prevent the permission-holder from avail-
ing himself of the permission. (von Wright 1999, 37)
Various authors have stressed the importance of the act of permission giving for
our understanding of permission—and its logic. Kelsen (1949) writes: “One can
give somebody a permission, confer upon somebody a right, only by imposing
a duty upon somebody else.” Permission giving therefore indirectly imposes a
constraint on the possibility of complying with a body of norms: through the
act, other parties are being given prohibitions against some way of acting. But
insofar as these prohibitions are not part of the content of the permission that has
been given, logically the existence of that permission does not entail the existence
of a prohibition imposed through the act.
2Note that it will not do to qualify this as a second order norm, i.e., as a norm that one ought not
to impose norms that cannot be jointly fulfilled (von Wright (1999, 33) himself suggests this). That
would only reintroduce the question concerning the nature of norm consistency at a second order
level.
3See also von Wright (1963, 88 and further) on the intersubjective aspects of permission.
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Von Wright argues that the relation between obligation and permission is thus
misconstrued by standard deontic logic as a logical connection between certain
statements about (existing) norms. Permission is not the absence of prohibition,
but it is a distinct category of norms. As a consequence, the principle that “what-
ever is not prohibited is thereby permitted” has been misread as a statement of
logic, whereas it is in fact a meta-norm—comparable to the legal formula nullum
crimen sine praevia lege poenali. Its imposition is an act whereby a norm system is
“closed off”, i.e., determining the normative status of any action not yet covered
by any of the preceding norm performatives.
In what follows, I present an attempt to characterise the logic of norm performa-
tives. It purports to do for the logic of norms, roughly, what prescriptivism (e.g.
Hare 1952) does for their content. As will be clear from the above, this involves
at least separate acts of obligation and permission, a multi-actor approach to rep-
resent the positive element of permission, and an act of closure whereby permis-
sion is granted for anything that has not yet been prohibited. First, I introduce
the concept of an effectivity relation and define some properties and operations
in terms of it. Second, I state an update semantics for (conditional) norm per-
formatives, with an aside concerning free choice permission. Third, I formulate
a dynamic semantics for norm propositions (i.e., statements about the existing
norms) in which we can study the ‘static’ consequences of a consistent ‘dynamics’
of imposing norms. Fourth and last, I define the ‘sealing legal act’ of permitting
whatever has not been forbidden. Before embarking on all of this, I first make
some preliminary clarifying remarks.
1. Preliminaries: actions, coalitions, performatives
What is the object of a norm? If you get permission to open the window, and
opening the window in the present circumstances will cool down the room, does
this mean that you have been given permission to cool down the room? In the
framework presented in this paper, the permission does not contradict a prohi-
bition against cooling down the room.4 In von Wright’s terminology, we may
distinguish the ‘result’ of an action from its ‘consequences’. The result of opening
the window is that the window is open, whereas the cooling down of the room is
a consequence. The consequences of an action are of course largely dependent on
the contingent circumstances. Because of this, we had best define norms in terms
of only the result of the permitted action.
4That is, unless we add a static principle that the ‘coalition with zero members’ has permission to
do all that is causally necessary to happen. In that case, the agglomeration principle of ‘additive
closure’ implies that whenever you get permission to open the window you also get permission to
open the window plus everything that is causally necessary to happen as a consequence. See also
the discussion on playable and closed world effectivity functions in Broersen et.al. 2009.
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For characterising the positive aspect of permission, we need to logically relate
the permissions and obligations of different actors. The framework presented
here imports various elements from coalition logic (Pauly 2001). Norms will
be attributed to coalitions, or groups, which are represented as arbitrary sets of
actors. This allows for an elegant characterisation of intersubjective consistency
of norm systems: if one coalition C gets permission to act in such a way that
A will necessarily become true, then the complement of C (in the society of
norm subjects) cannot subsequently be given permission to act in such a way as
to prevent A from becoming true—at least not without the norm-giver thereby
“crying for the moon”.
Von Wright (1996) contrasts norm propositions (statements about the norm sys-
tem) with norms proper, but he also uses the phrase ‘norm enunciation’ or ‘norm
expression’ for the latter. As I understand him, no commitment to moral realism
is intended by the distinction between norm propositions and norms proper. But
insofar as it might be, I will distance myself from that idea and contrast norm
propositions with norm performatives. So, rather than attributing deontic logic
to an ontologically primary domain of norm-entities, I attribute this logic to a do-
main of norm imposing (or norm enunciating) actions. Deontic logic is a reflec-
tion of the rules in this practice—the existence of which may in turn be explained
by reference to the ‘human rationality’ of the practice.
2. Effectivity relations
Pauly (2001) introduced Coalition Logic as a framework for reasoning about
strategic ability. It is a non-normal modal logic that is interpreted on a model
with a dynamic effectivity function replacing the accessibility relation in a Kripke
model for normal modal logic. Here, we appropriate the dynamic effectivity func-
tions, reformulating them as relations and defining update functions on them in a
semantics for norm performatives. Before coming to this semantics, this section
consists of the definitions of effectivity relations and the operations on them.
Given a domain S of states and a finite set N of agents, the effectivity relation E
attributes sets of states (propositions) to sets of agents (called ‘coalitions’), for any
given states. Intuitively, if 〈s ,C ,X 〉 ∈ E , then coalition C ‘can’ (in some further
to be specified sense) see to it that X (at the subsequent moment), at state s .
Definition 2.1 (Effectivity relation). An effectivity relation is a set
E ⊆ S × P ow(N ) × P ow(S ). The E -alternatives for C at s are
sEC =def {X | 〈s ,C ,X 〉 ∈ E}.
Given a coalition C and sets of states X and Y , we define EXCY =def{〈s ,C ,Y 〉 | s ∈X }.
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I write X u Y for the pairwise intersection of members of X and Y . The
complement of any set A in its obvious domain is written A. The effectivity
function fE can be reconstructed from the relation E by mapping each state s
onto the function mapping each coalition C onto sEC . The set EXCY will be used
later to represent the content of particular norm performatives, to the extent that
C must, or may, see to it that Y under circumstances X . This will be made more
clear later on.
In the formal analysis of effectivity functions, two important formal properties
are outcome monotonicity and superadditivity (see Pauly 2001). Outcome mono-
tonicity says that if a coalition is effective for some set X it is also effective for
any larger set: if the coalition can ensure that the next state will be some state in
X , then eo ipso it can ensure that the next state will be some state in X ∪Y . For
instance, if the majority of U.S. voters can ensure that Obama is re-elected, then
(trivially) they can also ensure that either Obama re-elected or Canada leaves the
Commonwealth of Nations. Superadditivity relates the powers of coalitions to
the powers of its members. If one party can ensure that the window is open and
another party can ensure that the door is open, then together they can ensure that
both the door and the window are open. This can only apply as a logical princi-
ple if the two coalitions are disjoint: e.g., if Sally is needed both for opening the
window and for opening the door, then she will have to chose with which party
to collaborate. The reason for calling this property superadditive is that it leaves
open the possibility that some larger coalition has powers that extend beyond the
powers of its members. As Gärdenfors points out:
. . . the rights of a group G is, normally, not just the union of the rights
of the individuals in G, but the group may agree on contracts and have
other forms of collectivistic rights which essentially extend the power
of the group beyond the individual rights. (Gärdenfors 1981, 344)
In keeping with the more process-oriented perspective on deontic logic, we define
two closure operations: the outcome monotonic closure and the additive closure.
The latter leaves open the abovementioned possibility of a group having abilities
extending beyond the sum of powers of its members, but it is not a ‘superadditive
closure’ since no such powers are included in the additive operation.
Definition 2.2 (Closure). Given an effectivity relation E , its outcome monotonic
closure is E↑:
X ∈ sE↑C iff Y ∈ sEC for some Y ⊆X .
Its additive closure is E+, which is defined by induction on the size of C ∪D :
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(X ∩Y ) ∈ sE+C∪D iff X ∈ sE+C and Y ∈ sE+D , provided C and D are disjoint.
To construct the additive closure we begin with the empty set, which partitions
into disjoint sets ; and ;—therefore it intersects all the things for which it is effec-
tive. Then we move to all singletons, partitioning into itself and the empty set;
all pairs of agents; and so on until we reach the entire domain of agents in the last
step.
Although perhaps formally complex, or involved, the meaning of additive closure
is straightforward: when one coalition C can independently force the next state
to be in the set X and another, disjoint coalition D can independently force the
next state to be in the set Y , then by additive closure C ∪D can force the next
state to be in (X ∩Y ). If we close permission additively, then we make permis-
sions independent of allegiance: if you are permitted to open the door and I am
permitted to open the window, then by additive closure we are jointly permitted
to vent the room.
Definition 2.3 (Properties). In terms of the closures defined above, we define the
following properties.
• E is outcome monotonic iff E↑ = E ;
• E is additive iff (E↑)+ = E↑;
• E is regular iff 〈s ,C ,;〉 6∈ E+, for any s and C .
Intersubjective compatibility of coalitional power is called ‘regularity’ in coalition
logic (Pauly 2001). This means that, if X ∈ sEC , then X 6∈ sEC . In words, if
coalition C can guarantee an outcome in X in state s , then the others cannot
simultaneously guarantee avoiding an outcome in X . It can easily be observed
that, if some two disjoint coalitions C1 and C2 can force disjoint sets of outcomes,
then in the additive closure their union can force the empty set. Regularity, in
our framework, is the property of effectivity relations for which this is not the
case.
Regularity is the formal representative of the idea that, in giving permission, the
norm giver is “binding one’s hands”. A norm giver who makes the effectivity
function irregular is neglecting the commitments undertaken earlier through his
other acts of norm imposition. Maintaining regularity will therefore be the way
we will understand the practice of consistent norm imposition, in the next sec-
tion. The first proposition connects regularity to the definition given by Pauly
(2001).
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Proposition 2.1. If there is some X and some C such that X ∈ sE↑C and X ∈ sE↑C ,
then E is not regular.
This proposition can easily be seen to be true, given the fact that if E meets the
stated condition, then E+ will contain 〈s ,N ,;〉.
The next proposition states that we can characterise additivity equivalently in a
different way. This also makes the connection with the definition of superaddi-
tivity in Coalition Logic (Pauly 2001) more evident.
Proposition 2.2. E is additive iff (∗) for all s , disjoint C1 and C2, and X1 and X2, if
X1 ∈ sEC1 and X2 ∈ sEC2 , then Y ∈ sEC1∪C2 for some Y ⊆ (X1 ∩X2).
Proof. ⇐: Suppose that E satisfies condition (∗) but E is not additive. Then
E↑ ⊂ (E↑)+, since additive closure is an additive operation. Given the inductive
definition of additive closure, there must be some coalitions A,B ,C , with A and
B disjoint and C =A∪B , such that 〈s ,A,X 〉 and 〈s ,B ,Y 〉 are members of E↑, but
〈s ,C , (X ∩Y )〉 is not. By outcome monotonic closure, there must be X ′ ⊇X and
Y ′ ⊇ Y such that 〈s ,A,X ′〉 and 〈s ,B ,Y ′〉 are members of E . On the basis of (∗)
we can then conclude that there is some set Z ⊆ (X ′ ∩Y ′) ∈ sEC . This clearly
implies that (X ∩Y ) ∈ sE↑C , which contradicts our earlier assumption.
⇒: Suppose that E is additive but does not satisfy condition (∗). Then there are
s , X1, X2, and disjoint A and B such that X1 ∈ sEA and X2 ∈ sEB but for no
Y ⊆ (X1 ∩X2), Y ∈ sEA∪B . If we now take the outcome monotonic closure of E ,
then this set will include 〈s ,A,X1〉 and 〈s ,B ,X2〉 but not 〈s ,A∪B , (X1∩X2)〉. Then
additive closure of E↑ will add that element, which contradicts our assumption
that E↑ = (E↑)+. uunionsq
To come to a characterisation of updating with norm performatives, we need to
introduce operations of adding particular norms to a given norm system. This
is done by defining two operations on effectivity relations: joining two of them
together and merging the powers incorporated in two of them. The first of these
operations is, under special circumstances a form of adding possibilities to an
effectivity relation while preserving additivity, as will be shown below.
Definition 2.4 (Operations). Let E1 and E2 be two effectivity relations. The join
operation unionsq and the merge operation u are defined in the following manner.
• E1unionsqE2 =def E1∪E2∪{〈s ,C , (X ∩Y )〉 | ∃D ⊆C :X ∈ sE1D and Y ∈ sE2(C\D)};
• E1 u E2 =def {〈s ,C ,X 〉 | X ∈ (sE1C u sE2C )};
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Some light can be shed on these definitions in the form of some propositions.
The next proposition states that intersection of two effectivity functions preserves
outcome monotonicity.
Proposition 2.3. (E↑1 u E↑2 ) = (E1 u E2)↑.
Proof. ⇒: If X ∈ s(E↑1 u E↑2 )C , then there are Y1 ∈ sE1C and Y2 ∈ sE2C and
Y ′1 ⊇ Y1 and Y ′2 ⊇ Y2 such that X = (Y ′1 ∩Y ′2). Then (Y1 ∩Y2) ∈ s(E1 u E2)C and
(Y1 ∩Y2)⊆X , so X ∈ s(E1 u E2)↑C .
⇐: If X ∈ s(E1 u E2)↑C , then there are Y1 ∈ sE1C and Y2 ∈ sE2C such that (Y1 ∩
Y2) ⊆ X . Then Y1 ∈ sE↑1C and (Y2 ∪ (X \ (Y1 ∩Y2)) ∈ E↑2C , so X ∈ s(E↑1 u E↑2 )C .uunionsq
Merging effectivity relations preserves additivity, as is stated and proved next.
Proposition 2.4. If E1 and E2 are additive, then so is E1 u E2.
Proof. Using Proposition 2.2. Suppose that there are s , X , Y and disjoint C
and D such that X ∈ s(E1 u E2)C and Y ∈ s(E1 u E2)D but for no Z ⊆ (X ∩Y ),
Z ∈ s(E1 u E2)C∪D . Then the definition of u tells us that there must be X1, X2,
Y1 and Y2 such that X = (X1 ∩X2) and Y = (Y1 ∩Y2) and X1 ∈ sE1C , X2 ∈ sE2C ,
Y1 ∈ sE1D and Y2 ∈ sE2D . But the assumption is that E1 and E2 are additive,
so (X1 ∩Y1) ∈ sE1(C∪D) and similarly for E2. Then, applying the definition of u
once more, we conclude that ((X1 ∩Y1)∩ (X2 ∩Y2)) ∈ s(E1 u E2)C∪D . Of course
((X1 ∩Y1)∩ (X2 ∩Y2))⊆ (X ∩Y ). uunionsq
Next, we show that additivity is preserved by the join operation under certain
circumstances. This is relevant, because the update semantics for permission per-
formatives will be defined as being of this form.
Proposition 2.5. If E1 is additive and E2 = EXCY for some X , C and Y , then
E1 unionsq E2 is additive.
Proof. For brevity we define E∗ =def (E1unionsqE2)\(E1∪E2), so E1unionsqE2 = E1∪E2∪E∗.
Suppose that there are some s , X1, X2 and disjoint C1 and C2 such that X1 ∈ s(E1unionsq
E2)C1 and X2 ∈ s(E1 unionsq E2)C2 whereas for no Y ⊆ (X1 ∩X2), Y ∈ s(E1 unionsq E2)C1∪C2 .
X1 and X2 must be members of either E1, E2 or E
∗. We proceed by cases:
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• X1 ∈ sE1C1 and X2 ∈ sE1C2 : by additivity of E1, (X1 ∩X2) ∈ sE1(C1∪C2 and so
(X1 ∩X2) ∈ s(E1 unionsq E2)C1∪C2 ;
• X1 ∈ sE2C1 and X2 ∈ sE2C2 : impossible since E2 is specific to only one coali-
tion.
• X1 ∈ sE∗C1 and X2 ∈ sE∗C2 : impossible because all coalitions in E∗ overlap;
• X1 ∈ sE1C1 and X2 ∈ sE∗C2 : by definition of unionsq, there must be some X3 and
X4 and disjoint C3 and C4, such that (X3 ∩X4) = X2 and (C3 ∪C4) = C2,
and such that X3 ∈ sE1C3 and X4 ∈ sE2C4 . But then it is also true that C1
and C3 are disjoint. So by additivity of E1, we conclude that there is some
Z ⊆ (X1 ∩X3) such that Z ∈ sE1(C1∪C3). And since C4 is also disjoint from
(C1∪C3), (Z ∩X4) ∈ sE∗(C1∪C3)∪C4 . We observe that (Z ∩X4)⊆ (X1∩X2), and
(C1∪C3)∪C4 = (C1∪C2). So for some subset of (X1∩X2), it is the case that
this set is an element of sE∗C1∪C2 and hence an element of s(E1 unionsq E2)C1∪C2 ,
which contradicts our assumption;
• X1 ∈ sE2C1 and X2 ∈ sE∗C2 : impossible because any member of E∗ concerns a
coalition superset of the one coalition occurring in E2;
• X1 ∈ sE1C1 and X2 ∈ sE2C2 : by definition of unionsq, (X1 ∩X2) ∈ sE∗C1∪C2 , which
contradicts our assumption, given E∗ ⊆ E1 unionsq E2.
uunionsq
Lastly, if E2 is already contained in the outcome monotonic closure of some ad-
ditive effectivity relation E1, then joining E2 to E1 will not yield anything new in
that outcome monotonic closure.
Proposition 2.6. If E1 is additive and E2 ⊆ E↑1 , then (E1 unionsq E2)↑ = E↑1 .
Proof. Let us abbreviate the set {〈s ,C , (X ∩Y )〉 | ∃D ⊆ C : X ∈ sE1D and Y ∈
sE2(C\D)} with E∗, so that (E1 unionsq E2) = (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E∗). It is enough to prove that
E∗ ⊆ E↑1 . Suppose that this is not the case, so 〈s ,C , (A∩B)〉 ∈ E∗\E↑1 . Then there is
some D ⊆C such that 〈s ,D ,A〉 ∈ E1 and 〈s , (C \D),B〉 ∈ E2. But then both tuples
are also members of E↑2 . By additivity of E1, this means that 〈s ,C , (A∩B)〉 ∈ E↑1 ,
which contradicts our assumption. uunionsq
3. Update semantics for norm performatives
3.1. General introduction into update semantics
Philosophers of logic have often thought that the logical concepts—consistency,
entailment, contradiction, and so on—must be explicated in terms of truth. Von
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Wright claimed that this idea wrongly limits the applicability of such concepts.
Deontic logic gets part of its philosophical significance from the fact
that norms and valuations, though removed from the realm of truth,
yet are subject to logical law. This shows that logic, so to speak, has a
wider reach than truth. (von Wright 1957, vii)
The insistence that this is not a genuine application of logical concepts is, accord-
ing to von Wright (1996, 45), “simply stubbornness”. As indicated earlier, von
Wright’s reference to “norms and valuations” will be understood here as applying
to norm performatives. So, I contend that logical concepts of consistency and
entailment apply to norm performatives despite the fact that truth evaluation is
not applicable to such performatives—or any other performatives for that matter.
Update semantics (Veltman 1996) explicates the logical concepts in other terms.
The meaning of a sentence is explicated, not in terms of conditions under which
the message conveyed by it is true, but in terms of the change in one’s commit-
ment slate (here: norm system) as a result of accepting the message conveyed by it.
To each sentence is assigned a function that transforms an input commitment slate
into a resulting, or ‘updated’ commitment slate. Consistency, entailment and va-
lidity are characterised in terms of this update function. A commitment slate en-
tails, or ‘supports’, a sentence if, and only if, updating that commitment slate with
the sentence has no effect. That is, the commitment slate then already incorpo-
rates the message conveyed by the sentence. A sequence of sentences entails a fur-
ther sentence if, and only if, any commitment slate that we update subsequently
with the sequence of sentences supports the further sentence. This account of
entailment is more general than the classical one in the sense that it allows for a
straightforward application to sentences to which truth evaluation does not apply,
such as interrogatives (Groenendijk 1999) and imperatives (Mastop 2012).
In this section an update system for norm performatives is presented.5 This sys-
tem characterises the meanings of the norm performatives as such: its object lan-
guage is a language of performatives. In the following section this update seman-
tics is used to define a dynamic deontic logic. There the object language is ‘con-
stative’ or descriptive, allowing us to reason about the updates effected by norm
performatives, and its consequences for the norm system.
5Formal analyses of permission change have been provided by Kamp (1973), Lewis (1979) and
van Rooy (2000), amongst others. Some earlier approaches to an update semantics of normative
language are van der Torre and Tan (1998), Žarnic´ (2002) and Mastop (2012).
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3.2. An update system
The goal in update semantics is to define an update system, consisting of a language
(a space of message-conveying expressions), a space of possible norm systems, and
an update function that assigns, in a systematic way, to every message-conveying
expression in the language, an update function determining what norm system
results from accepting the message conveyed by that expression in a given initial
norm system.
We first define a norm system, then a language of norm performatives and third
an update semantics.
Definition 3.1 (Norm system). Given a set P of simple proposition letters, their
valuation is an assignment V : P → P ow(S ). A norm system S is a tuple
〈FS ,DS ,RS〉, such that FS ⊆ S and DS and RS are effectivity relations. The
empty norm system 0 is 〈S ,D0,R0〉, where D0 = (S ×P ow(N )× {S }) and
R0 = ;. S is called regular iff DS ,RS and (DS uRS ) are regular. S is called possible
iff FS 6= ;.
A norm system has three parameters: a representation of the factual information
available; an effectivity relation D representing the duties of coalitions at any
given state; and an effectivity relation R for the rights of coalitions at any given
state. The empty norm system is one in which there is no information (every
state is possible), there are no rights, and only the trivial outcome is obligatory.6
A norm system is regular if the combination of rights and duties is intersubjec-
tively consistent. Every coalition must be able to combine one way to fulfil all of
its duties with one right, without thereby making it logically impossible for the
others to do the same thing.
Admittedly, this requirement is somewhat arbitrary. A libertarian might insist
that every combination of individual choices for each agent of a way to fulfil
its duties plus one right should be consistent. Moreover, depending on what
rights we consider it might be argued that rights agglomerate. The definition of
regularity follows a definition given by von Wright, cf. below.
We write S↑ for 〈FS ,D↑S ,R↑S〉. When it comes to assessing whether a norm sys-
tem supports some sentence, new duties the fulfilment of which entails fulfilling
already existing duties should be considered as already supported. This way de-
rived obligations and derived permissions are supported as well.
6This last feature can be compared to the deontic logic axiom that O(p ∨ ¬p). Here it is not an
axiom but merely a feature of the ‘null’ state in which there are no substantial norms.
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Definition 3.2 (Performative language). Given a set P of propositional atoms, LP
is the usual propositional language based on P . The language L1 is the smallest
set containing LP and OC (φ|ψ) and PC (φ|ψ) for all φ and ψ in LP .
The language L1 is interpreted below as a language of performatives. The propo-
sitional sentences are interpreted as informative of the facts concerning which
state we are in. In the terminology of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (van Ditmarsch
et al. 2007) they are ‘public announcements’. The sentences OC (φ|ψ) are per-
formatives whereby the coalition C is obligated to see to it that φ under the
circumstances that ψ. Roughly speaking, they are conditional imperatives. The
sentences PC (φ|ψ), correspondingly, are conditional permission grantings.
Definition 3.3 (Update semantics). Given a norm system 〈FS ,DS ,RS〉, the update
of the norm system with a L1 expression is defined in the following way.
〈FS ,DS ,RS〉[p] = 〈FS ∩V (p),DS ,RS〉〈FS ,DS ,RS〉[¬φ] = 〈(FS \ FS[φ]),DS ,RS〉
〈FS ,DS ,RS〉[φ∧ψ] = 〈(FS[φ] ∩ FS[ψ]),DS ,RS〉
〈FS ,DS ,RS〉[OC (ψ|φ)] = 〈FS ,DS u E‖φ‖C‖ψ‖,RS〉
〈FS ,DS ,RS〉[PC (ψ|φ)] = 〈FS ,DS ,RS unionsq E‖φ‖C‖ψ‖〉
Here, ‖φ‖= F0[φ], for any LP -expression φ.
In defining norm consistency I follow von Wright (1996) (cf. von Wright 1999,
34) who proposes that obligations and permissions are consistent if, and only if,
all obligations plus one permission (hence, the set DSuRS ) are jointly consistent.7
Different definitions may be considered and motivated, and different definitions
may be given.
Definition 3.4 (Logical concepts). Given a norm system S, S supports α, written
S  α, if, and only if, (S[α])↑ = S↑. And α entails β if, and only if, S[α]β for
all S. Performative α is consistent in S iff S[α] is possible and regular.
The main purpose of this definition is to demonstrate that the logical concepts
can be explicated in terms of performatives, without a prior explication of them
in terms of truth conditions or truth preservation. Although the norm perfor-
matives still have propositional contents, elsewhere I have argued that a semantics
of imperatives and permission sentences is possible in which they do not embed
propositions (Mastop 2012).
7He in fact requires that they be not only consistent, but ‘doable’. To come closer to that notion,
the concept of violation, Definition 6.1, may be used.
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A first simple example is the following. The two tuples—or permissive norms, if
you like—〈s ,C ,‖φ‖〉 and 〈s ,C ,‖¬φ‖〉 can happily coexist in RS without imply-
ing that S is irregular. However, if we were to institute such norms by means of
permission performatives, we would have to do so by means of updating some
norm system S with PC (φ|ψ) and PC (¬φ|χ ), with the requirement that s is a
member of both ‖ψ‖ and ‖χ ‖. The result of the update is a norm system S ′ such
that 〈s ,N ,;〉 ∈ RS ′ . So the update does lead to irregularity, which means that
the second update is inconsistent in its update context. It is the granting of the
permissions which is inconsistent, not the coexistence of the permissive norms in
themselves.
The propositions stated in the previous section show that updating preserves ad-
ditivity of RS and DS . If we start out with a additive norm system, such as 0, then
we will maintain additivity of our permissive and commissive norms.
3.3. Free choice permission
An ongoing discussion in the literature on imperative logic is whether or not
disjunctive imperatives are granting a free choice. The issue has sometimes been
presented as a matter of the validity of an inference from “!(A∨B)” to “!A”, instead
of vice versa. The correct presentation of the issue, I believe, is that on a free
choice account, the command OC ((p ∨ q)|r ) compels C to make a free choice
between seeing to it that p or seeing to it that q , if r—and so the subsequent
prohibition of either seeing to it that p or seeing to it that q , if r , would be
“crying for the moon” to repeat von Wright’s phrasing. Similarly, the permission
PC ((p ∨ q)|r ) would grant C to a free choice between invoking permission for p
and invoking permission for q , if r .
I am convinced that disjunctive norm performatives are free choice granting in
this sense. Pragmatic accounts of free choice ‘readings’ of ‘or’, in terms of plau-
sible speaker’s intentions, generally only explain our surprise upon a later limita-
tion of our choices, and not our objection that we had been granted a choice. If
mom says “Clean up your room or do your homework” and you start doing your
homework, then if dad later interrupts you and says “Stop doing your homework
and clean up your room” you may protest and say: “But mom told me to do ei-
ther”. You may of course also decide to comply with dad’s command, since doing
so does not interfere with complying with mom’s command, but that is not to
say that the two commands are consistent.
The present framework in terms of effectivity relations easily admits for an incor-
poration of a free choice permission account of disjunctive norm performatives.
The set s(DS )C represents the alternative ways for C to fulfil all of its obligations
at s . A free choice command diversifies this set, merging its elements with the
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contents of both disjuncts. In the familiar example by Ross (1941), in order to
fulfil all of your obligations, X (post the letter plus any other obligations), or Y
(burn the letter plus any other obligations). Adding a command that one not burn
the letter would turn Y into ;, thus breaching norm consistency. Even granting
some disjoint coalition the permission to see to it that the letter is not burned
would violate the free choice granted to the subject of the disjunctive command.
In order to accommodate a free choice semantics for disjunction, we specify an
alternative way of defining ‖φ‖, comparable to alternative semantics (Rooth 1992)
or inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli and Roelofsen 2011).
‖p‖ = {V (p)} ‖¬p‖ = {V (p)}
‖φ∨ψ‖ = ‖φ‖∪ ‖ψ‖ ‖¬(φ∨ψ)‖ = ‖¬φ‖u ‖¬ψ‖
‖φ∧ψ‖ = ‖φ‖u ‖ψ‖ ‖¬(φ∧ψ)‖ = ‖¬φ‖∪ ‖¬ψ‖
Furthermore, we define EXCY =def
⋃
Y∈Y (EXCY ). The definitions of the update
semantics can then be left as stated above.
Without free choice, 0[OC ((p∨q)|r )][OC (¬p|r )] is regular (and possible). With
the alternative definition of ‖φ‖, it is not regular. The first update introduces into
DS the items 〈s ,C ′,V (p)〉 and 〈s ,C ′,V (q)〉, for any s ∈ V (r ) and C ′ ⊇ C . The
second update then requires the merging of DS with items 〈s ,C ′,V (p)〉, for any
s ∈ V (r ) and C ′ ⊇ C . Consequently, if V (r ) is not empty, we end up with an
item 〈s ,N , (V (p)∩V (p))〉, making the resulting norm system irregular. Further-
more, with the alternative semantics, we find that PC ((p ∨ q)|r )  PC (p|r ). So
disjunctive permission granting is free choice permission granting.
In what follows, I will disregard the matter of free choice interpretations of ‘or’
in performatives, assuming the simpler semantics of the previous section.
4. Dynamic deontic logic
The update semantics only allows us to reason about norm systems in terms of
the possibility to update it in some way. A dynamic semantics relates the update
system to a language to reason about the static facts concerning the norm system.8
Below we specify a model incorporating a norm system as well as an (unchanging)
effectivity relation for ability.
Definition 4.1 (Model). A model M is a quadruple 〈S , S,A,V 〉, where S is a
norm system,V is a valuation of proposition letters and A is an effectivity relation
that is (i) additive, (ii) regular, and for all s and C , (iii) sAC is nonempty. For ease
of notation, M[α] =def 〈S , S[α],A,V 〉, for any α ∈ L1.
8See a series of recent papers by Yamada for a developed account of dynamic deontic logic; e.g.
Yamada (2008).
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Next we define a language to reason, in a standard modal logic sense, about these
models. Continuing to follow von Wright’s terminology, we might call this a
language of norm propositions, although perhaps these modal formulas come
closer to his idea of “practical necessity” in von Wright 1999.
Definition 4.2 (Modal language). L2 is the modal language based on the propo-
sitional atoms P and the sentential operators ∇, 4C , ◊C , C , and [α], for any
C ⊆N and α in L1.
◊Cφ means that φ is permitted for C and Cφ means that φ is obligatory for
C . The modality ∇ represents the information present in FS . For instance, if
we accept a norm performative OC (p|q) and an informative statement q , then
the proposition ∇C p will be true. This proposition can be rendered in natural
language as “Given the known (acknowledged) facts, C ought to see to it that p”.
The dynamic modal sentence [α]φ is to be read as “After accepting α in the norm
system, φ is true”.
Definition 4.3 (Dynamic semantics). Let M be a model and S its norm system.
The satisfaction set of an L2-expression in M is defined inductively below.
s ∈ ‖φ‖M iff s ∈ F0[φ], for φ ∈ LP
s ∈ ‖∇φ‖M iff FS ⊆ ‖φ‖M
s ∈ ‖4Cφ‖M iff 〈s ,C ,‖φ‖M 〉 ∈A↑
s ∈ ‖◊Cφ‖M iff 〈s ,C ,‖φ‖M 〉 ∈ R↑S
s ∈ ‖Cφ‖M iff 〈s ,C ,‖φ‖M 〉 ∈D↑S
s ∈ ‖[α]φ‖M iff s ∈ ‖φ‖M[α]
State s satisfies φ in M , written M , s |=φ, iff s ∈ ‖φ‖M . Formula φ is valid in M ,
written M |=φ, iff ‖φ‖M =S .
In the evaluation we make use of the outcome monotonic extensions of the ef-
fectivity relations. This is so in order to ensure that derived obligations can be
expressed as well. When a person has an obligation to close all the windows in
the building, then he also has an obligation to close some particular window in
the building.
The semantics for obligation does not as such guarantee that the obligation op-
erator is agglomerating. That is, it is possible that there are mutually exclusive
ways to fulfil all of one’s obligations, in which case we may find that C p and
C q but not C (p ∧ q).9 Agglomeration is valid (in a model) just in case there
9If we accept the free choice semantics for disjunction it is possible to define an obligation operator
such that only C (p ∨ q) would come out true in this situation.
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is a unique minimal element to sDC for every s and C . The update operation u
preserves this property for the effectivity relation D .
Proposition 4.1. Let S be the norm system in M , with RS and DS additive. The
update and dynamic semantics can be related as follows (with φ and ψ in LP ): (i)
M |= ∇φ iff S  φ; (ii) M |= ψ→ ◊Cφ iff S  PC (φ|ψ); (iii) M |= ψ→ Cφ iff
S OC (φ|ψ).
Proof. For permission. If RS is additive, then M |=ψ→ ◊Cφ iff S  PC (φ|ψ).
⇒: The formula ψ→ ◊Cφ is valid on M iff 〈s ,C ,‖φ‖M 〉 ∈ R↑S for all s ∈ ‖ψ‖M .
This is equivalent to E‖φ‖C‖ψ‖ ⊆ R↑S . The update semantics defines RS[PC (φ|ψ)] =
(RS unionsq E‖φ‖C‖ψ‖). From Proposition 2.6 we know that (RS unionsq E‖φ‖C‖ψ‖)↑ = R↑S ,
in view of the additivity of RS . Combining these facts, R
↑
S[PC (φ|ψ)] = R
↑
S , which
means that S  PC (φ|ψ).
⇐: Given the definition of support, S  PC (φ|ψ) iff (RSunionsqE‖φ‖C‖ψ‖)↑ = R↑S . From
this it follows directly that E‖φ‖C‖ψ‖ ⊆ R↑S . As pointed out above, this implies that
ψ→ ◊φ is valid on M . uunionsq
The facts stated above form the core of the argument of this paper: the logical
properties of norms as such are rather minimal. What are commonly considered
to be the ‘axioms of deontic logic’ are in reality derived properties of norm sys-
tems. The properties in question are derived from the logic that is really inherent
in the practice of norm imposition.
In the last two sections, we go into some possible further directions in which
this approach to the logic of norms can be taken. The next section concerns the
common dictum that ‘ought implies can’. Until now we have limited the logic
to ‘ought implies may’. That is, there can be no conflict within the norm system
itself if it is to be consistent. Yet, we may feel that no obligation can exist if its
fulfilment is in any way impossible in the light of the actual practical possibilities
of the subject of that obligation.
Then, in section 5, we consider the principle of nullum crimen sine lege: that ev-
erything that has not been forbidden is thereby permitted. This principle should
be understood as a meta-norm, rather than a logical truth. So conceived, it can be
formally represented by an update that ‘closes off’ the norm system, completing
it with permissions.
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5. Sealing legal principle
The sealing legal principle states that ‘whatever is not forbidden is permitted’. As
mentioned above, von Wright argued that this principle is not a logical truth but a
performance whereby the norm system is closed. There are different possibilities
for closing a norm system, an obvious alternative is ‘whatever is not (expressly)
permitted is forbidden’.
Understood as a statement, the sealing legal principle could be formally rendered
as ¬C¬φ → ◊Cφ or, considering regularity of permission, ¬◊C¬φ → ◊Cφ.
The latter formulation is known in coalition logic as ‘maximality’. Considering
the closure operations defined earlier, it might be thought that we could introduce
yet another one: the maximal closure of E , obtained by means of the following
equation.
X ∈ sEmaxC iff X ∈ sEC or X 6∈ sEC .
The problem with this is, that if neither X ∈ sEC nor X ∈ sEC , we would add
both, leading to an effectivity relation that is no longer regular: its additive clo-
sure would be such that ; ∈ sEN . Therefore, if we would characterise it as the
‘maximality’ closure condition, the sealing legal principle would not be norm
consistent in all norm systems. If neither of us has a prohibition against either
closing the door or keeping the door open, then giving us permission to do these
things would imply giving the pair of us permission to a enforce a contradiction.
What we need is a restricted variant of the closure such that norm consistency
can be guaranteed.
The issue is not merely technical. It requires that we explicate what is meant
by the formulation of the sealing legal principle. When the authority is closing
off the norm system, he is evidently not giving us permission to the actions of
others. That is, the authority is not granting everyone a claim right with respect
to others if that right had not been explicitly denied beforehand.10 This shows
that we must interpret the sealing legal principle as limited by the abilities of the
coalitions: ‘whatever is not forbidden that you can do, is hereby permitted’.
We cannot characterise the sealing legal act as an operation on norm systems,
because it has to be relative to the actual abilities of the agents. Therefore, we
define it as an operation on models.
Definition 5.1 (Sealing Legal Act). Let a model M = 〈S , 〈F ,D ,R〉,A,V 〉
be given. The sealing legal act ω is a closure operation on M such that
M[ω] = 〈S , 〈F ,D ,Rc 〉,A,V 〉, such that:
Rc = (R↑ ∪ (A∩R−)↑)+.
10See for instance von Wright (1963, 89) on the concept of a ‘claim’.
100
R. Mastop | Norm Performatives and Deontic Logic
R− is the complementary effectivity relation to R, defined by X ∈ sR−C iff for no
D disjoint with C and no Y disjoint with X , Y ∈ sR↑D .
Let us call an effectivity relation E maximal iff either X ∈ sEC or X ∈ sEC , for
each s , X andC . Then, under the assumption of maximality of the ability relation
A, the sealing legal closure principle preserves regularity and ensures maximality
of permissions.
Proposition 5.1. If R is regular and A is regular and maximal, then Rc is regular
and maximal.
Proof. For regularity: First note that R↑ is regular and, because A is regular, the
same is true for (A∩ R−)↑. Given that R is regular, if X ∈ sR↑C then Y 6∈ sR−C
for any Y ⊆ X . Therefore, X 6∈ s(A∩ R−)↑
C
. So, the additive closure of R↑ and
(A∩R−)↑ will be regular as well.
For maximality: If either X ∈ sRC or X ∈ sRC , then the same is true for Rc . So
suppose that neither X ∈ sRC nor X ∈ sRC . By maximality of A, either X ∈ sAC
or X ∈ sAC . Suppose, without loss of generality, that X ∈ sAC . By regularity of
R, for no Y ⊆ X and for no D disjoint with C , Y ∈ sRD . This is equivalent to
X ∈ sR−C . Therefore 〈s ,C ,X 〉 ∈ (A∩ R−), so X ∈ sRcC . This proves that Rc is
maximal. uunionsq
Note that, as the proof displays, the regularity and maximality of A is crucial for
the regularity and maximality of Rc .
Several theorists of norm logic differentiate between rights and weaker liberties.
We can see them as logically distinct, in the sense that a norm that effectively
prohibits the invocation of a right can be said to be inconsistent with the right,
whereas a liberty can be retracted by a later prohibition. For instance, the right
to express your opinion precludes, by consistency, the command to refrain from
voicing any criticism against the state. In the absence of a prohibition, you have a
liberty to open your store on a Sunday. However, that liberty can be taken away
by the government by means of an explicit prohibition.
This distinction can be expressed using the sealing legal principle. Coalition C
has a liberty to X in state s , in model M , with norm system S iff (i) X 6∈ sR↑SC , (ii)
X ∈ sRcSC and (iii) DS u {〈s ,C ,X 〉} is regular. Perhaps liberties, so understood,
are somewhat like “tolerance” in the sense of von Wright (1963, 88). Note that
we are not adding any claim rights to R by the sealing legal principle. So it is a
maximisation of rights but at the same time a minimisation of claims.
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6. Consistency and quandary freedom
Consistency as defined is, arguably, still a rather abstract concept. Even if the
norm-giver is consistent in imposing norms, the norms may still be impossible
to execute for a coalition, given its limited powers. As a final consideration, the
framework is extended to deal with the real, practical limitations of agents and
coalitions in complying with their obligations (and invoking their permissions).
To begin with, the following definition is intended to capture these practical im-
possibilities.
Definition 6.1 (Violation and quandary). Given a model M = 〈S , S,A,V 〉, X ∈
sAC is a violation in M if, and only if, for no Y ∈ sAC , (X ∩Y ) ∈ s(RS uDS )N .
State s is a quandary for C in M if, and only if, all X ∈ sAC are violations.
In imposing norms the minimal requirement is consistency: no conflict internal
to the norm system. However, ideally we also want to avoid creating quandaries
in people’s law abiding conduct. Hamblin (1972) distinguishes different versions
of this requirement of “quandary freedom”, with varying strength. At the very
least, we must avoid that N is in a quandary, for in that case the norms cannot
but be violated. As a form of liberalism, we might demand that no singleton
coalition (i.e., every individual actor) is ever in a quandary: no individual should
be forced to collaborate with others in order to not violate the norms. A strategic
version of quandary freedom would be that each coalition should be able (given
some initial state) to avoid getting into a quandary at any point. Another version
of quandary freedom is that, as long as the coalition obeys the norms, it does not
enter into a quandary. This is not a very robust form of quandary freedom: the
norm system works well as long as everybody acts in accordance with it, but it
might not be prepared for cases in which the norms are violated. Lastly, the most
demanding form of quandary freedom is that no quandary ever arises.
The definition above allows for a straightforward syntactic definition of these
forms of quandary freedom. We extend the language with constants QC , for any
C ⊆N , expressing that coalition C is in a quandary. We add the semantic clause:
s ∈ ‖QC ‖M iff s is a quandary for C in M . Now these forms of quandary freedom
can be defined in our language as follows:









C⊆N (¬QC →4C¬QC );
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A norm system can be evaluated, relative to a given model and state, in various re-
spects: whether it prohibits moral wrongs well enough, to what extent it respects
the autonomy and integrity of agents, and also how well it minimizes the occur-
rence of quandaries. One way to test a norm system in the latter respect would be
to determine whether the formula for some version of quandary freedom is true
in the current state, valid in the model, or perhaps true in all states that can be
‘reached’ from the current state.
7. Conclusion
Standard deontic logic is a logic of impersonal “ought to be”-statements and its
semantics is often presented as distinguishing a set of ‘ideal worlds’ in a Kripke
model. This paper addresses (what I believe to be) several shortcomings of that
approach. Firstly, the logic of permission is only understandable in a social set-
ting, in which the freedom of one agent contributes to the normative constraints
for others. Furthermore, the validity of free choice permission requires another
move away from standard deontic logic. But most importantly, the aim of this
contribution has been to motivate and present a dynamic semantic perspective on
the logic of norms: to be consistent in giving orders and permissions, the norm
giver cannot prohibit what it has permitted before, or permit incompatible things
to different parties. The inspiration for this view comes from von Wright’s (1996;
1999) later work on the nature of deontic logic and its formalisation is a variant
of the update semantics of Veltman (1996).
In the formal literature on ‘dynamics’ in semantics and logic, the original idea in
dynamic semantics of dynamifying the standard conception of meaning (Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof (1991), Veltman (1996)) has faded somewhat to the back-
ground in recent work on public announcements and dynamic epistemic logic
and public announcement logic (see for instance Wang (2011)), assuming a stan-
dard static intensional semantics for the dynamic modalities. The present paper
goes against this trend, arguing for the primacy of the update formalism as giving
a semantic foundation for the dynamic logic.
A further study of the formalism has to come at a later stage. Apart from an
axiomatisation of both the update semantics and of the dynamic logic, a natural
direction to take would be an investigation into the formal analysis of rights and
legal positions.11 The discussions on the sealing legal principle and quandary
freedom can be seen as a first step in this direction.
11Compare Lindahl (1977), or von Wright (1963, 88 and further). See also Mastop (2002).
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